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1. Introduction.
Knowledge builds upon previous knowledge. This is true for most
innovations nowadays, especially in hi-tech industries like molecular
biology, plant biotechnology, semiconductors and software. In some
cases, the innovation consists of an improvement of an older version of
the same good. In other cases, the research leading to the discovery of
the new good depends on the access to research tools, techniques and
inputs which are previous innovations themselves.
In any case, innovation activity will in general depend on the access
to previous innovations. Depending on the structure of the patent
system, many of these inventions will be protected by patents. This
means that patents affect not only the revenues of the innovator, but
also the cost of performing an innovation.
Recent concern has arisen on the possibility that patents (or other
kinds of Intellectual Property) can restrict access to research inputs,
hindering innovation as a consequence. The innovator and the owners
of patents on previous inventions share the revenues of the innova-
tion. As the number of inputs needed in research increases, the in-
novator faces a patent thicket and is threatened by the possibility of
hold-up, namely the risk that a useful innovation is not developed be-
cause of lack of agreement with the patent holders. This problem has
been dubbed the tragedy of the anticommons (Heller 1998, Heller and
Eisenberg 1998). When too many agents have exclusion rights over
the use of a common resource, this resource tends to be underutilized,
in clear duality with the tragedy of the commons in which too many
agents hold rights of use and the resource tends to be overused.
This problem may be particularly acute in biomedical research, where
there is a deep controversy over the patenting of gene fragments and
research tools. Take for example the case of the MSP1 antigen (Plas-
modium Falciparum Merozoite Specific Protein 1), widely recognized
as the most promising candidate for an anti-malarial vaccine. A study
of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002) found more
than 39 patent families covering DNA fragments, methods for process-
ing fragments, production systems, vaccine delivery systems, etc. As a
consequence, a potential innovator willing to commercialize a vaccine
based on MSP1 must get prior permission from the owners of these
property rights.
Anticommons can arise in biotechnology as well. A good example is
Golden Rice, which required payment of up to 40 licenses, depending on
the country of commercialization (Graff, Cullen, Bradford, Zilberman,
and Bennett 2003).
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As a final example, consider the case of software patents, which cover
mathematical algorithms and techniques. Software programs have be-
come so complex that any single program may use thousands of al-
gorithms (Garfinkel, Stallman, and Kapor 1991), possibly infringing a
large number of patents. This explains the expected increase in patent
litigation in this sector in the next years (think of Microsoft vs. the
programmers and users of Linux), and the formation of a Patent Com-
mons by firms involved in the Open Source community (IBM, HP,
Novel, Sun, etc.).
These concerns have led the USPTO (US Patents and Trademarks
Office) to recommend Patent Pools as a possible solution to limited
access to biotechnology research tools (Clark, Piccolo, Stanton, and
Tyson 2000). A Patent Pool is a cooperative agreement among patent
holders, through which they agree on the licensing terms of a subset of
their patents.
We address these issues by constructing a model of sequential inno-
vation in which an innovator uses n patented inputs to develop a new
invention. Substitutability between the inputs goes from zero (per-
fect complements) to infinity (perfect substitutes) and the input sellers
compete in prices but do not know the exact value of the innovation
for the innovator.
We study how the probability of performing the innovation changes
as technologies become more complex and find that it decreases when
the inputs are market complements and increases when they are market
substitutes. Therefore, we prove that the anticommons hypothesis may
hold when inputs are essential and not easy to substitute.
Then we analyze the limiting economy when n → ∞. We show
that the probability of innovation is always less than socially optimal
unless the inputs are perfect substitutes. Moreover, the probability of
innovation goes to zero when the elasticity of substitution is below a
threshold level which is higher than 1.
We also analyze the creation of a Patent Pool as a possible solution
to the tragedy of the anticommons. The Patent Pool reduces the cost of
innovation if the inputs are complements and increases it if the inputs
are substitutes. The reason is that when the inputs are complements,
an increase in the price of one of them decreases the profit of the rest
of firms. The pool takes this effect into account when maximizing total
profits, and therefore will set a lower price for the inputs.
Finally, we find that the optimal degree of patent protection is de-
creasing in n if the inputs are highly complementary (i.e. have low
substitutability) and increasing in n in the opposite case. This sur-
prising result contrasts with the increase in the strength of Intellectual
Property Rights on research tools in the last two decades, and can be
related to an extended belief that patents are good for innovation and
the rent-seeking activities of agents with vested interests.
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1.1. Related literature. This paper is related to the literatures of se-
quential innovation, complementary monopoly and patent pools. How-
ever, we will see that the focus of this paper is different. We analyze
the effects of patents on the pricing of research inputs and examine the
consequences of an increase in the complexity of innovation (measured
by n) on the probability that a new good is introduced and the optimal
patent policy.
There is an extended literature on Sequential Innovation (Scotchmer
1991, Green and Scotchmer 1995, Chang 1995, Scotchmer 1996), which
is mainly concerned with the optimal division of profits between succes-
sive innovators. Generally, in these models, there are two innovations
which have to be introduced sequentially (the second innovation can-
not be introduced until the first one has), and the objective is to find
the patent policy that maximizes the incentives to invest in both in-
novations. In this paper we generalize these models by assuming that
any innovation is based on n of previous innovations, as in Boldrin and
Levine (2005).
In this sense our paper is more related to the literature on comple-
mentary monopoly initiated by Cournot (1838). Cournot modeled a
competitive producer of brass who must buy zinc and copper from two
separate monopolists (zinc and copper are perfect complements), and
showed that (i) the price of the inputs is higher than the price that a
single provider would set, (ii) the total cost of the inputs is increasing
in the number of inputs, (iii) in the limit, as n → ∞ the cost of the
inputs is such that the demand for the final good is zero.
Cournot’s theory of complementary monopoly has been later ex-
tended in various directions. Bergstrom (1978) allows for a more gen-
eral technology and studies the behavior of the factor market in depth.
He is concerned with analyzing the duality between price and quantity
competition and assumes a zero marginal cost of the inputs. Our model
is similar to Bergstrom’s, but we focus on a different problem (sequen-
tial innovation) and assume a positive marginal cost. As we will show,
Bergstrom’s assumption of zero marginal cost is not trivial, as the re-
sults depend both quantitatively and qualitatively on this assumption.
Chari and Jones (2000) relate complementary monopoly to the exter-
nality problem. They show that, because agents play strategically,
the market outcome in economies with complementarities is inefficient.
This is true even if property rights are fully assigned. They also show
that the most inefficient outcomes result from economies with a large
number of agents, which is related to the case when the probability of
innovation goes to zero as n→∞ in our model.
Cournot’s theory has been also used by the literature on patent
pools. Shapiro (2001) was the first to suggest that patent pools may
be anticompetitive when they are formed by substitute patents, and
pro-competitive when formed by complementary patents. Lerner and
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Tirole (2004) build a model to generalize Shapiro’s results. They base
their definition of substitutability on the shape of the payoff function
of the innovator and prove that the higher the substitutability among
patents, the higher the probability that the patent pool is anticom-
petitive. There are two main differences with respect to our model.
First, in addition to showing that patent pools reduce the price of the
inputs when they are complements, we also show that the pool price is
independent on the number of inputs, and therefore patent pools can
potentially prevent the tragedy of the anticommons from happening.
Second, we base our definition of complements and substitutes on the
traditional cross-price derivatives, which allows us to be more precise
in determining the effects of patent pools on innovation and to explain
the economic intuition behind the results.
2. The model.
There are n research inputs (x1, ..., xn) and a potential innovator
who can use the n inputs in R&D in order to invent a new good. The
n inputs have already been invented and are ready to be produced.
The structure of Intellectual Property Rights is such that each input
is protected by a patent, granting its owner a monopoly over it. Each
patent is owned by a different patentee and thus each of the n inputs is
supplied by a different producer. Given that the inputs are imperfect
substitutes of each other, the factor market is a differentiated goods
oligopoly. The input sellers compete in prices and the value of the
innovation is private information of the innovator.
2.1. Technology. The innovator can perform R&D to invent a new
final good according to the following CES technology:
(1) y = A
(
n∑
i=1
xi
ρ
) 1
ρ
where y is a measure of the R&D effort, A is a scale parameter, xi is the
amount of input i used, n is the number of inputs and ρ ∈ (−∞, 1] is a
technological parameter related to the substitutability between inputs.
The innovator faces an indivisibility problem, meaning that a min-
imum amount of R&D effort is required to invent a new good. When
the R&D effort is below that threshold level there is no innovation.
Without loss of generality we can set the threshold level at 1, so that
the indicator function for the innovation is:
(2) I =
{
1 if y ≥ 1
0 otherwise
We set the scale parameter A equal to n(ρ−1)/ρ in order to elimi-
nate any returns from specialization or division of labor. Usually CES
production functions exhibit a property called increasing returns to
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specialization (or love for variety in the case of utility functions). Fol-
lowing an argument similar to Romer (1987), suppose that the pro-
duction function is y = (
∑n
i=1 xi
ρ)
1/ρ
, and let X be the total quantity
of inputs used in production. Because of symmetry, all inputs will be
used in the same quantity in the equilibrium, so xi = X/n for all i, and
output will be equal to y = n(1−ρ)/ρX. There are positive returns to
specialization because an increase in n holding X constant causes out-
put to increase. We eliminate this effect by introducing A = n(ρ−1)/ρ
in the production function.
The complexity of the innovation is measured by n. More complex
technologies use a larger number of components or require more re-
search tools in order to be developed. Each input is produced with a
constant marginal cost of ε > 0. We assume that the resources used
to produce inputs are sold in a competitive market, so that the private
and the social cost of producing inputs coincide. The assumption of no
returns to specialization guarantees that the social cost of performing
the innovation does not change as technologies become more complex.
In other words, there is no technological advantage or disadvantage
from increases in n.
2.2. Value of the innovation and structure of the information.
The social value of the innovation (v) is the total surplus generated by
the new product. To focus on the factor market, we will assume that
the innovator is a perfect price discriminator in the final good market.
This means that the private value for the innovator coincides with the
social value of the innovation.
The value of the innovation v is private information of the innova-
tor. This may be because the innovator has better information about
the characteristics of the new product or about the valuation of the
consumers. The sellers of inputs only know that v has a cumulative
distribution F (v). Therefore F (v) is the probability that the innovation
has a return less or equal than v. In Section 5 we show that the as-
sumptions of perfect price discrimination and asymmetric information
can be relaxed without altering the results.
The hazard function is defined as h(v) = f(v)/(1−F (v)), where f(v)
is the density function corresponding to F (v). In order to guarantee the
quasi-concavity of the maximization problem of the input producers,
the following assumption will hold throughout the paper:
Assumption 1 (Nondecreasing hazard function). h(v) > 0 and h′(v) ≥
0 on a support [v, v¯], and h(v) = 0 outside of this support.
This assumption on the hazard function is very general, and holds for
most continuous distribution functions. We will analyze the meaning
of the hazard function in section 3.1. Notice that we are not restricting
v nor v¯ to be of finite value.
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An important assumption is that the distribution of values of the
innovation does not change with n. This assumption, together with
the absence of returns to specialization in the R&D technology imply
the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The probability that an invention is socially optimal does
not depend on its complexity.
Proof. The probability that an innovation is socially optimal is the
probability that its social value is larger or equal than its social cost.
The social cost of an innovation coincides with the resources used to
produce it. Therefore, the probability that an innovation is socially
optimal is Prob (v −∑ni=1 ε xi ≥ 0). Because of the symmetry in the
innovation technology, xi = 1/n, so this probability becomes 1−F (ε),
which depends on the distribution of social values of the innovation
and the marginal cost of the inputs but not on the number of inputs
used in R&D.
In this paper, we are interested in studying the effects of increasing
technological complexity on the probability of innovation. Lemma 1
assures that a change in n affects this probability only through a change
in the number of inputs that have to be negotiated, but not through a
change in the social value or cost of the innovation. In other words, we
want to compare innovations with different n but the same net social
value. In Section 5 we relax these assumptions by letting the value of
the innovation be a function of n and allowing returns to specialization
in the R&D technology. We find that the main results of the paper are
not significantly affected by a change in these assumptions.
2.3. Market interaction. The players of the game are the n input
sellers and the innovator. A strategy for input seller i is a choice of price
for her input. A strategy for the innovator is a function g : Rn+ × v →
Rn+, namely a demand xi for each input, as a function of the price of
all the inputs and the realization of the value of the innovation.
The timing of the game is as follows: (i) the input producers simulta-
neously set the price of their inputs, (ii) Nature extracts a value v from
the distribution F (v), and (iii) given prices, the innovator calculates
the input mix that minimizes the cost of innovation and then decides
whether to innovate or not.
The equilibrium concept we use is Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equi-
librium (SSPE). A set of strategies {pi}ni=1, g is a SSPE if it is a Nash
equilibrium of every subgame of the original game, and pi = p for all i.
The payoff for input producer i is xi (pi−ε) and the payoff of the
innovator is I v −∑ni=1 pi xi.
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2.3.1. Innovator’s Problem. Given input prices {pi}ni=1, the innovator
solves the following Cost Minimization Problem (CMP):
c = min
n∑
i=1
pixi(3)
s.t. n−
1−ρ
ρ
(
n∑
i=1
xi
ρ
) 1
ρ
≥ 1
The solution to this problem is the set of conditional factor demands xi
(input demands conditioned on the innovation being performed) and
the minimum cost of innovation c. Given c, the innovator will perform
the innovation (I = 1) if v ≥ c.
2.3.2. Input Seller’s Problem. When setting the price the sellers of in-
puts do not know the realization of v. They only know that given
{pi}ni=1 the probability that v ≥ c (the probability of innovation) is
1−F (c). Therefore, the expected demand of input firm i is E(xi) =
(1−F (c))xi, and its Profit Maximization Problem (PMP) is:
(4) max
pi
Πi = (1− F (c))xi(pi − ε)
where both c and xi come from the CMP of the innovator.
3. Equilibrium.
In this section we solve recursively for the SSPE. Therefore, we begin
by solving the Innovator’s Problem (second stage of the game). The
demands are those of a typical CES production function.
Proposition 1 (Solution of the Innovator’s Problem). The conditional
demand of input i and the cost of innovation are:
xi = n
− 1
1−σ p−σi
(
n∑
i=1
pi
1−σ
) σ
1−σ
c = n−
1
1−σ
(
n∑
i=1
pi
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
where σ = 1/(1− ρ) is the elasticity of substitution between the inputs.
The innovator will introduce the new good (I=1) if v ≥ c.
The restrictions on ρ imply that the elasticity of substitution σ goes
from 0 (perfect complements) to ∞ (perfect substitutes).
Given xi and c, the symmetric equilibrium price p solves
p = argmax
pi≥ε
(1− F (c)) xi (pi − ε)
where c = n−
1
1−σ
(
p1−σi + (n− 1)p1−σ
) 1
1−σ and xi = n
−1 p−σi c
σ. It is
useful to notice that in the symmetric equilibrium (pi = p for all i),
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c = p and xi = 1/n for all i. Also, p ≥ ε in equilibrium because
otherwise firms would be making negative profits and would find it
profitable to deviate by setting a higher price.
Because of the nature of Nash equilibria, for any value of n, ε, and
σ < ∞ there exists equilibria where p is so high that the probability
of innovation is zero (i.e. profits are zero for all input sellers) but
any deviation by a single input seller is not enough to make it positive.
However, these are trivial equilibria coming from the definition of Nash
equilibria without any intrinsic economic value. We are interested in
the existence of equilibria with a positive probability of innovation
(p < v¯).
The following proposition characterizes the solution of the first stage
of the game (the Input Seller’s Problem).
Proposition 2. A SSPE with positive probability of innovation (p < v¯)
exists and is unique. The equilibrium price solves
(p− ε)h(p) = n− σ (n− 1) (p− ε)/p
The conditional input demand is x = 1/n, the cost of innovation is
c = p and the probability of innovation is 1− F (p).
Proof. The firm wants to maximize (1−F (c))xi (pi−ε). The derivative
with respect to price is:
D(pi) = −f(c) ∂c
∂pi
xi (pi − ε) + (1− F (c))
(
∂xi
∂pi
(pi − ε) + xi
)
By Shepard’s Lemma ∂c/∂pi = xi, and by symmetry c = p, xi = 1/n
and ∂xi/∂pi = −(n − 1)σ/(n2 p). Therefore, the first order condition
becomes:
D(p) = −f(p) p− ε
n2
+ (1− F (p))
(
−σ (n− 1) (p− ε)
n2 p
+
1
n
)
Now we prove that the solution cannot be ε nor v¯ for n <∞. p = ε
cannot be the equilibrium because D(ε) = (1 − F (ε))/n > 0. Also,
p = v¯ cannot be the equilibrium both if v¯ is finite or infinite. If v¯ <∞,
then D(v¯) = −f(v¯) ( v¯−ε
n
)
< 0. On the other hand, limp→∞D(p) =
−∞ < 0. Therefore, the solution must satisfy D(p) = 0. Multiplying
D(p) by −n2/(1− F (p)) we get:
(5) h(p) (p− ε) + σ (n− 1) p− ε
p
− n = 0
We can be sure that equation (5) has exactly one solution because it is
continuously increasing in p by Assumption 1, is negative when p = ε
and is positive when p→ v¯ (Assumption 1 implies that limp→v¯ h(p) p =
∞ for finite or infinite v¯). Therefore, the solution exists and is unique.
Rearranging terms in equation (5) we get the desired result.
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Example. We will find useful to illustrate the results with the help
on an example based on the uniform distribution. This example has the
advantage of providing an explicit solution for the equilibrium price.
Specifically, assume that the value of the innovation (v) is uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1. This means that F (v) = v and h(v) =
1/(1− v). The equilibrium price is:
(6) p =
a+
√
a2 + 4σ ε (n−1) b
2 b
where a = n+ ε− σ(n− 1)(1 + ε) and b = 1 + n(1− σ) + σ. The cost
of innovation is equal to the price and the probability of innovation is
simply 1− p.
3.1. The meaning of the First Order Condition. It interesting
to analyze the meaning of the optimality condition. In the traditional
case, when there is no uncertainty, the PMP is simply to maximize
xi(pi − ε). In this case, the optimal price solves:
pi − ε
pi
=
1
ηxi
where ηxi is the price elasticity of the demand for inputs (in absolute
value) and (pi−ε)/pi is the Lerner index, which measures the gain over
marginal cost as a proportion of price.
In our case, the PMP is to maximize (1 − F (c))xi (pi − ε), so the
optimal price solves:
pi − ε
pi
=
1
ηxi + h(c) pixi
where h(c) is the hazard function.
Therefore, our model adds an specific term related with the probabil-
ity of selling the inputs. The hazard function is h(c) = −∂(1−F (c))
∂c
1
(1−F (c) ,
so it measures the proportional decrease in the probability of selling
the inputs when total cost increases. We can interpret 1 − F (c) as a
demand for final good and c as its price (read Section 5). Then, if
we multiply the hazard function by c, we get the elasticity of the final
demand in absolute value (ηD = h(c)c).
This means that the optimal price in Proposition 2 solves:
pi − ε
pi
=
1
ηxi + ηD
pixi
c
so our additional term is equal to the price-elasticity of final demand
times the share of input i in total expenditure. Notice that this result
is very general, since we are not assuming any specific demand function
for the inputs, nor any distribution for the values of the innovation.
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3.2. Elasticity of substitution. The price of the inputs and the cost
of innovation in equilibrium depend on the elasticity of substitution,
the complexity of the innovation and the marginal cost of the inputs.
In the following subsections we will analyze the comparative statics of
the above equilibrium.
Proposition 3. The cost of innovation is decreasing in σ.
Proof. Equation (5) provides an implicit function of p in terms of σ.
We can calculate ∂c/∂σ using the implicit function theorem (remember
that p=c in the symmetric equilibrium):
∂c
∂σ
= − (n− 1)(p− ε)/p
h(p) + h′(p) (p− ε) + σ (n− 1)ε/p2
It is easy to see that this derivative is always negative (the numerator
and the denominator are positive). The result follows.
Figure 1 depicts the cost of innovation (i.e. the price of the inputs)
as a function of σ for the uniform distribution and for n = 10 and
ε = 0.1.
Figure 1: Cost of innovation as a function of σ.
The cost of innovation is monotonically decreasing in σ because of
increased competition as the inputs become more substitutable. As
σ → ∞ price converges to marginal cost ε, which is the standard
Bertrand price competition result with homogeneous goods.
3.3. Complements and Substitutes. We will classify inputs in mar-
ket complements and substitutes according to the sign of the cross-price
derivative of expected demand which, in this setting, is equivalent to
analyzing the cross-price derivative of expected profit. This classifica-
tion is equivalent to the one used in game theory, where the actions of
two agents are said to be complements (substitutes) when an increase
in the action of one of them implies a decrease (increase) in the payoff
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of the other agent. In our model, the actions are prices and the payoff
is expected profit. Notice that this is an equilibrium definition since it
is based on the best response of the innovator.
Definition 1 (Market complements and substitutes). Input j is a mar-
ket complement (substitute) of input i if ∂E(xi)
∂pj
< 0
(
∂E(xi)
∂pj
> 0
)
.
An increase in the price of input j has two effects on the expected
demand of input i. On one hand, the conditional demand of input
i increases (substitution effect). On the other hand, the probability
of innovation decreases because the inputs are more expensive to the
innovator (innovation effect). The sign of the cross-price derivative de-
pends on which of the two effects is stronger. The cross-price derivative
is:
(7)
∂E(xi)
∂pj
= (1− F (c)) ∂xi
∂pj
+
∂(1− F (c))
∂pj
xi
The first effect is related to the standard substitution effect of con-
sumer demand theory. Remember that the Cost Minimization Problem
is equivalent to the Expenditure Minimization Problem and in this case
there are no wealth effects of price changes (the conditional factor de-
mands are equivalent to Hicksian demands). In principle, the derivative
∂xi/∂pj could be positive, negative or zero. However, the property of
negative semidefiniteness of the matrix of cross-price derivatives (which
implies that every input must at least have one technical substitute),
together with the symmetry of the production function, implies that
this derivative is non-negative. The inputs will be technical substi-
tutes (∂xi/∂pj > 0) except in the case of perfect complements, where
∂xi/∂pj = 0.
The second effect is due to the fact that the demand for innovations
is downward sloping. The cost of the inputs used in research affects the
profitability of innovation. Therefore, an increase in the price of any
input will lower the probability of innovation. This effect is negative,
except in the case of perfect substitutes, when it is zero.
Now that our definition of complementarity and substitutability is
clear, we can be precise in our exposition. In what follows when we
say that inputs are complements or substitutes, we mean that they are
market complements or substitutes. We will see that the distinction
between complements and substitutes is crucial for the predictions of
the model.
The following lemma shows the value of σ that makes the cross-price
derivative equal to zero.
Lemma 2. The cross-price derivative ∂E(xi)/∂pj is zero in the sym-
metric equilibrium if and only if σ = σ∗, where σ∗ is the argument that
solves h
(
σ
σ−1ε
)
= σ − 1.
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Proof. The cross-price derivative is:
∂E(xi)
∂pj
= (1− F (c)) ∂xi
∂pj
− f(c)xi
By Shepard’s Lemma, ∂c/∂pj = xj. Imposing symmetry, xi = xj =
1/n and ∂xi/∂pj = σ/(n
2 p). Rearranging terms we get:
(8)
∂E(xi)
∂pj
=
1
n (1− F (p))
(
σ
p
− h(p)
)
This will be zero in the symmetric equilibrium only when h(p) = σ/p.
Introducing this into the first order condition (5) and rearranging we
get (p − ε)/p = σ−1 or p = σε/(σ − 1). Plugging this value of p in
h(p) = σ/p we get the desired result.
The following proposition classifies inputs in complements and sub-
stitutes according to Definition 1. It is interesting to see that this
distinction depends on the values of σ and ε, but not on the value of
n.
Proposition 4. In the symmetric equilibrium, inputs are complements
when σ < σ∗ and substitutes when σ > σ∗.
Proof. We know from Lemma 2 that the cross-price derivative is zero
when σ = σ∗ and that its sign depends on σ/p − h(p). The latter
expression is increasing in σ because p is decreasing in σ from Propo-
sition 3 and h is non-decreasing in p from Assumption 1. The result
follows.
Interestingly, the value of σ which divides inputs in complements
and substitutes has to be larger or equal than 1. To see this, suppose
that σ∗ < 1. This means that h(εσ∗/(σ∗ − 1)) < 0, which is not
possible. In the case of the uniform distribution, for example, inputs
are complements when σ < (1 + ε)/(1 − ε) and substitutes when σ >
(1 + ε)/(1− ε).
3.4. Patent Pools. Until now, the research inputs were priced non-
cooperatively. In this subsection we analyze what happens when all
inputs are priced cooperatively, either by a collective institution such
as a patent pool or by a single patent holder (monopolist) that owns
all the patents. Proposition 5 shows the equilibrium price in this case.
The difference with the previous case is that now the patent holder
maximizes joint-profits and therefore takes into account the cross-price
effects between expected demands.
Proposition 5 (Patent Pool). The equilibrium price when all the in-
puts are priced cooperatively (p∗) is the argument that solves h(p)(p−
ε) = 1.
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Proof. Given the symmetric input demands, the pool wants to sell a
symmetric bundle. Therefore xi = 1/n and pi = p for all i and the pool
wants to maximize total profits n (1 − F (p)) (p − ε). The first order
condition is n(−f(p) (p − ε) + 1 − F (p)) = 0. Rearranging terms we
get the desired result.
Notice that p∗ depends only on the functional form of h and the
value of ε, but not on the values of σ or n. The following proposition
compares the cost of innovation when the inputs are priced individually
(c) with that of a patent pool (p∗).
Proposition 6. The cost of innovation when the inputs are priced
non-cooperatively (c) is equal to that of a patent pool (p∗) when the
cross-price derivative is zero (σ = σ∗), it is larger when the inputs are
complements (σ < σ∗) and it is smaller when the inputs are substitutes
(σ > σ∗).
Proof. We know from the proof of Lemma 2 that when σ = σ∗, the
cross-price derivative is zero and σ = p h(p). Replacing this in (5) and
rearranging we get h(p)(p − ε) = 1, which is the cooperative result.
Given that p is decreasing in σ, whereas p∗ is independent of σ, p > p∗
when σ < σ∗ and p < p∗ when σ > σ∗.
The difference between cooperative and non-cooperative pricing is
that in the first case the firms take into account the effect of an increase
in the price of one input on the demand for the rest. When σ = σ∗ this
effect is zero so the price of the pool coincides with that of the non-
cooperative equilibrium. When σ < σ∗ the effect is negative, so the
pool knows that an increase in price will decrease the demand for the
rest and will set a price smaller than the uncoordinated input sellers.
The opposite happens when σ > σ∗.
In the case of the uniform distribution, the pool price is p∗ = (1 +
ε)/2. Figure 2 compares this price with the non-cooperative price for
ε = 0.1 and n = 5.
Figure 2: Cooperative and non-cooperative pricing.
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3.5. Increasing complexity. Proposition 7 shows that the sign of the
effect of an increase in the complexity of the innovation (n) depends
on whether the inputs are complements or substitutes.
Proposition 7. The cost of innovation increases as innovation be-
comes more complex if the inputs are complements (σ < σ∗) and de-
creases if the inputs are substitutes (σ > σ∗).
Proof. We are looking for the effect of a unit increase in n, but it
will suffice to determine the sign of ∂c/∂n. Equation (5) provides an
implicit function of c in terms of n. Therefore, we can calculate ∂c/∂n
using the implicit function theorem:
∂c
∂n
=
1− σ (p− ε)/p
h′(p) (p− ε) + h(p) + σ(n− 1)ε/p2
We know that the denominator is always positive. Therefore, the sign
of this derivative depends on the sign of the numerator.
From equation (5) we get the following relation in equilibrium σ (p−
ε)/p = (n − h(p) (p − ε))/(n − 1). Introducing this in the numerator
and operating, it becomes (h(p) (p − ε) − 1)/(n − 1). We know that
h(p) (p − ε) = 1 when σ = σ∗ from the proof of Proposition 6. Given
that h(p) (p− ε) is increasing in p, it is decreasing in σ. Therefore, the
numerator is positive when σ < σ∗ and it is negative when σ > σ∗.
The result follows.
The probability of innovation is simply 1 − F (c), so it moves in an
opposite direction to the cost:
dPr
dn
= −f(c) dc
dn
As before, the effect on the probability of innovation of an increase in
the complexity of innovation depends on the substitutability between
the inputs. If inputs are complements, then the probability decreases
as n increases. If inputs are substitutes, then the probability increases
as n increases.
Figure 3 shows what happens in the uniform distribution example
as the complexity of the innovation increases from n = 5 to n = 15,
for ε = 0.1. The cost schedules cross when σ = 1.22, which is exactly
σ∗ = (1 + ε)/(1− ε). This means that the cost of innovation increases
if the inputs have low substitutability and decreases in case of high
substitutability.
Proposition 7 is the most important result of the paper. It says
that patents are very harmful when innovation is sequential and the
research inputs are essential or difficult to substitute, but do not pose
an important problem when inputs are easily replaceable.
Figure 4a shows cost as a function of n for complementary inputs
and ε = 0.1 in the case of the uniform distribution. As innovation
becomes more complex, the cost of innovation increases and converges
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Figure 3: Effects of an increase in the complexity of innovation.
to 1 when n → ∞. This means that the probability of innovation
decreases with n and converges to 0. Convergence is faster when σ gets
closer to zero. When the substitutability between the inputs is very
low (σ close to zero), the probability of innovation is very small even
for simple innovations (low n).
Figure 4b shows that the conclusions change when the research in-
puts are substitutes. In this case the cost of innovation decreases when
the complexity of innovation increases (i.e. the probability of innova-
tion increases with n).
(a) Complements. (b) Substitutes.
Figure 4: Cost of innovation as a function of n.
3.6. The Tragedy of the Anticommons Revisited. The model
presented in this paper gives a formal treatment to the tragedy of the
anticommons (Heller 1998). An anticommon arises when multiple own-
ers have the right to exclude each other from using a scarce resource,
causing its inefficient under-utilization. This problem is symmetric to
the tragedy of the commons, where multiple owners have the right to
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use a scarce resource, but nobody has exclusion rights and resources
tend to be overused.
In our model, the scarce resource is the net social value of the in-
novation (v − ε) to be shared between the innovator and the patent
holders. Each patent holder decides the selling price of her input. It
is interesting to notice that when σ ≤ 1 all the inputs are essential to
perform the innovation so all the input sellers can potentially impede
the innovation by setting a high price.
We show in Proposition 6 that when the inputs are market comple-
ments the cost of gathering all the inputs with fragmented property
rights is larger than what it would be if there was a sole owner of all
the inputs or the inputs were priced cooperatively by a collective insti-
tution like a patent pool. Moreover, according to Proposition 7, this
problem gets worse as technologies become more complex, requiring
more and more inputs in order to be developed. These results hold not
only for perfect complementarity between the inputs, but whenever
the elasticity of substitution is not sufficiently large to compensate the
negative effect of price changes on the probability of innovation.
The result in Proposition 6 is consistent with the findings of Shapiro
(2001) and Lerner and Tirole (2004). The difference is that since we
use the standard definition of complements and substitutes, we can
be more precise in explaining the reasons why the cost of gathering
a bundle of patents increases or decreases with the formation of the
pool. It all depends on the relation between input demands. If the
joint profit of the rest of firms decreases with an increase in the price
of one firm (the input is a complement of the rest of inputs), a pool
will consider it optimal to set a lower price when taking this effect into
account. The opposite happens when the inputs are substitutes.
3.7. High complexity and Monopolistic Competition. It is in-
teresting to analyze the equilibrium of the economy when n → ∞ for
two reasons. First, n→∞ represents innovations that are highly com-
plex and therefore require a large number of inputs to be developed.
The innovator faces a patent thicket and has to gather inputs from
many patentees. We know how the probability of innovation changes
as n increases, but it is interesting to determine in what cases it will go
to 0 or 1− F (ε). Second, in this limiting economy there is an infinite
number of input sellers, so the effect of a price change by a single firm
has a infinitesimal impact on the cost of innovation, and the market
becomes monopolistically competitive.
Proposition 8 characterizes equilibria with positive probability of
innovation (p < v¯). In this case there are values of σ for which there is
no equilibrium with positive probability of innovation.
Proposition 8. A SSPE with p < v¯ exists only when σ > σˆ where
σˆ = v¯
v¯−ε . The equilibrium price and cost of innovation are p =
σ
σ−1 ε.
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Proof. Dividing the first order condition (5) by n, we get:
h(p) (p− ε) 1
n
+ σ
(
n− 1
n
) (
p− ε
p
)
− 1 = 0
As n → ∞, the term with the hazard function goes to zero. This is
because each firm becomes negligible and does not affect the probability
of innovation on its own. It is clear that the equilibrium price of the
limiting economy solves:
σ
(
p− ε
p
)
− 1 = 0
Therefore, p = σ
σ−1 ε, which is between ε and v¯ only when σ >
v¯
v¯−ε .
It is interesting to comment on three characteristics of the equilib-
rium. First, any p ≥ v¯ is an equilibrium for any value of σ in this
limiting economy. If p ≥ v¯ the probability of innovation is zero, but
if a single input seller deviates, its impact on the cost of innovation
is infinitesimal, so the probability of innovation (i.e. expected profits)
remains unchanged. Therefore, there are no profitable deviations when
p ≥ v¯.
Second, the equilibrium quantity xi goes to zero as n→∞. This is
because the number of inputs is increasing towards infinity but the total
quantity of inputs required is keeping constant, given our assumptions
on the innovation technology.
Finally, it is easy to show that 1 ≤ σˆ < σ∗. The first inequality
follows trivially from the fact that σˆ = v¯/(v¯ − ε). Therefore, σˆ = 1
only when v¯ →∞ or ε = 0. For the second inequality, it is enough to
compare the equilibrium price when σ = σˆ with the equilibrium price
when σ = σ∗, since price is decreasing in σ. When σ = σˆ, price is
equal to v¯. When σ = σ∗ we know that the equilibrium price solves
h(p)(p− ε) = 1. If p = v¯, then h(p) (p− ε)→∞, which is much larger
than 1. For h(p) (p− ε) to decrease and approach 1, p has to decrease.
This means that equilibrium price is larger with σˆ and therefore σˆ < σ∗.
Figure 5 shows the cost schedule as a function of σ when v¯ = 1 and
ε = 0.1. The equilibrium of the limiting economy does not depend on
the distribution of v, but it depends on the upper bound of the support
of the distribution.
The equilibrium price is the same that Dixit and Stiglitz’s (1977)
monopolistic competition model. When inputs are substitutes, firms
set a mark-up over marginal cost equal to 1/(σ − 1). This means
that the pricing inefficiency decreases as n increases, but it does not
disappear even when n→∞.
For complements, the outcome depends on whether σ is greater or
less than σˆ = v¯/(v¯− ε). When σ > v¯/(v¯− ε), firms set a mark-up just
like in the substitutes case. When σ ≤ v¯/(v¯ − ε), the only equilibria
have p ≥ v¯ and so the probability of innovation is zero. In this case, as
ANTICOMMONS IN SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 17
Figure 5: Cost of innovation in the limiting economy.
n increases the inefficiency due to monopoly pricing increases and it is
at its maximum when n→∞.
4. Patent Policy and Welfare Analysis.
In this section we look for the patent policy that maximizes the
probability that a socially desirable innovation is performed. We will
see that this policy also maximizes expected social welfare when the
inputs are perfect complements or perfect substitutes.
We assume that the patent policy in the input market is related to
that of the output market so that patents for research inputs cannot
be removed without removing patents for final goods too. Therefore,
patent policy affects not only the cost of innovation, but also the rev-
enues from selling the new good. Although the model remains static
in nature, these modifications add a dynamic flavor to it, since we can
imagine that the new good that is being created will become an input
for a future invention.
First of all, we have to be more precise with respect to the effect
of patents in the final good sector. If the new good is protected by a
patent, the innovator is the unique seller of the good and remains as
a perfect price discriminator. If the new good is not protected by a
patent, a large number of imitators will enter the market and perfect
competition will drive price to marginal cost. In both cases the quantity
of the final good produced will be optimal, so there is no inefficiency
coming from monopoly pricing in the final goods market.
Patent policy will be represented by a continuous parameter φ ∈
[0, 1]. Higher values of φ mean stronger patent protection.
This policy parameter φ can represent patent length. The innovator
is granted a patent for a proportion φ of the useful life of the invention,
but at the same time, a proportion φ of previous patents has not yet
expired. φ could also be related to the novelty requirement, or to the
18 LLANES AND TRENTO
strength with which IP law is enforced in courts. In this case, there
is a probability φ that the innovator is granted a patent and that the
patent can be defended successfully in court. At the same time, only
a proportion φ of previous inventors has been granted a patent.
Under both interpretations, the revenue of the innovation is φ v,
and the innovator has to pay a non-competitive price pi for φn inputs
(covered with patents), and the competitive price ε for the remaining
(1− φ)n inputs.
The patent policy that maximizes the probability of innovation also
maximizes expected social welfare only when the inputs are perfect
complements or perfects substitutes. In the intermediate cases, the
patent policy not only affects the probability of innovation but also
its social cost (through its effect on the equilibrium combination of
inputs). Therefore, when 0 < σ < ∞, the policy that maximizes the
probability will not maximize expected social welfare in general.
The assumptions above guarantee that the patent regime does not
affect the social value of the innovation (i.e. the total consumer surplus
from the new good). In order for the patent system not to affect the
social cost of the inputs either, it should lead to an optimal combination
of the inputs for the innovation, which requires all inputs to be used in
the same quantity. If this is not the case, the cost of the inputs used
in the innovation will be larger than ε.
This condition holds when the inputs are perfect complements, given
that conditional demands are constant and independent of price, and
when the inputs are perfect substitutes, given that the price of the
inputs will be equal to ε independently of the patent policy. When
the inputs are imperfect substitutes, on the other hand, the innovator
will not use the optimal combination if the inputs have different prices,
which will happen if some inputs are protected by patents and others
are not 0 < φ < 1.
4.1. Perfect Complements. Given that it is not possible to obtain a
general solution for the optimal policy, we will first focus in the perfect
complements case (σ = 0). Then, we will show that the results depend
on the substitutability between the inputs with the aid of numerical
simulations.
Under perfect complementarity, the probability that revenues (φv)
exceed the cost of the innovation is 1 − F (c/φ) and the conditional
input demands are constant and equal to 1/n, regardless of whether
the inputs are protected by patents or not. The cost of innovation is
c =
φn∑
i=1
1
n
pi + (1− φ) ε
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The Profit Maximization Problem (PMP) of the input sellers be-
comes:
max(1− F (c/φ)) 1
n
(pi − ε)
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium given patent
policy φ:
Proposition 9. The cost of innovation in the symmetric equilibrium
solves
(9) h(c/φ) (c− ε) = nφ2
and its derivative with respect to patent policy φ is
(10)
dc
dφ
=
h′ c (c− e) + 2nφ3
φ (h′ (c− ε) + hφ)
Proof. The first order condition of the input seller’s PMP is:
−f
(
c
φ
)
1
φ
∂c
∂pi
pi − ε
n
+
(
1− F
(
c
φ
))
1
n
= 0
It is easy to prove that in a symmetric equilibrium, p− ε = (c− ε)/φ.
Imposing symmetry, using Sheppard’s Lemma and rearranging we get
expression (9). Equation (10) follows from a simple application of the
implicit function theorem.
The following lemma presents a simplification which allows us to find
the optimal patent policy.
Lemma 3. The patent policy that maximizes the probability of inno-
vation solves ∂c
∂φ
= c
φ
.
Proof. The problem of maximizing 1 − F (c(φ)/φ) is equivalent to the
problem of minimizing c(φ)/φ, given that F is non-decreasing. The
first order condition for the latter is
c′(φ)φ− c(φ)
φ2
= 0
Rearranging this expression, we get our desired result.
Proposition 10. The optimal patent policy φ∗ solves
h
(
2ε
φ
)
=
nφ2
ε
and its derivative with respect to the complexity of the innovation is
∂φ∗
∂n
= − φ
4
2(h′ ε2 + nφ3)
which is always negative.
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Proof. From Lemma 3 we know that the optimal policy solves ∂c
∂φ
= c
φ
.
Using (10) we have that:
h′ c (c− e) + 2nφ3
φ (h′ (c− ε) + hφ) =
c
φ
Simplifying we get:
(11) h(c/φ) c = 2nφ2
Combining this last expression with (9) we get that at the optimal
policy the cost of innovation is c = 2ε. Introducing this in (11), we get
our first result. The second result follows from an application of the
implicit function theorem.
From Proposition 10 it follows that the optimal policy is larger than
zero and less than one for ε > 0. This means that some protection is
always desirable, even when the research inputs cannot be substituted
at all. However, the most important result in Proposition 10 is that the
degree of patent protection should decrease when technologies become
more complex.
4.2. Perfect Substitutes. Proposition 10 shows the effects of increases
in complexity on the optimal policy when the inputs are perfect com-
plements. However, the result is completely reversed when the inputs
are perfect substitutes. In this case, the cost of innovation is ε for any
level of patent protection. This means that the patent policy should
be directed at maximizing the revenues from the innovation, so φ∗ = 1
regardless of the complexity of the innovation.
4.3. Imperfect Substitutes. A comparison of the results with σ = 0
and σ →∞ gives an intuition of what happens for intermediate values
of σ. There will be a σ¯ such that the optimal policy decreases for lower
degrees of substitutability, and increases in the opposite case. Given
that it is not possible to get an explicit formula for σ¯, we resort to
a numerical analysis. Figure 6 shows the optimal patent policy as a
function of σ for n = 10 and n = 20 (ε = 0.1). We can see that the
optimal policy decreases as n goes from 10 to 20 for σ < 1.137, and
increases in the opposite case, which certifies our previous conjecture.
5. Extensions.
In this section we analyze the consequences of relaxing some of the
basic assumptions of the model.
5.1. Social value and cost depend on complexity. Until now, we
have assumed that the distribution of values of the innovation and the
social cost of the inputs do not depend on n, and that there are no
returns from specialization. Under these assumptions, a change in n
only changes the number of input producers with whom the innovator
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Figure 6: Optimal policy for different values of n.
has to negotiate patents in order to innovate, but does not change the
probability that the innovation is socially valuable.
However, it could be argued that the revenues of the innovator or
the cost of the inputs are increasing or decreasing in n, or that a higher
number of inputs has a positive impact in the R&D technology due to
a higher division of labor. All these changes have equivalent effects on
the probability of innovation so we will concentrate on changes in the
distribution of returns of the innovation.
Let the return of the innovation be a(n) v, with a′(n) ≥ 0 or a′(n) ≤ 0
and limn→∞ a(n) = a∞ > 0. v has a cumulative distribution F (v)
as before. Notice that we are not setting an upper bound on a∞.
All we require is that if a is non-increasing it does not go to zero as
n → ∞. This is because if a∞ = 0 then the distribution of values of
the innovation will collapse to zero and the innovation will never be
profitable when n is very large by assumption.
The probability of innovation is 1 − F (c/a), and in the symmetric
equilibrium c = p and x = 1/n. The equilibrium price of the inputs
(i.e. the cost of innovation) solves:
(p− ε)h(p/a)/a = n− σ (n− 1) (p− ε)/p
but we are more interested in the ratio k = p/a. Replacing in the
previous equation we have:
(12) (k − ε/a)h(k) = n− σ (n− 1) (k − ε/a)/k
This equilibrium is equivalent to the one in Proposition 2, thinking of
k as the cost of innovation and ε/a as the social cost of the inputs.
We can prove the same theorems as before with respect to the differ-
ence between complements and substitutes, the welfare effects of patent
pools and ∂k/∂σ. However, ∂k/∂n will be different because now ε/a
is a function of n.
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Using the implicit function theorem on the equilibrium relation (12)
we get:
∂k
∂n
=
h(k) (k−ε/a)−1
n−1 − na
′
a
ε/a
k−ε/a
h′(k) (k − ε/a) + h(k) + σ(n− 1)(ε/a)/k2
As before, the sign of this derivative depends only on the sign of
the numerator, but now there is an additional term which shifts the
threshold value of σ that divides positive and negative changes in k.
This threshold value will be to the left of σ∗ when a′(n) > 0 and to the
right of σ∗ when a′(n) < 0.
Two important remarks are in order. First, if a′(n) is large then the
last term in the numerator will determine the sign of the derivative. In
this case, the effect of changes in n on revenues completely overcomes
the effect on the pricing of inputs, and ∂k/∂n has the opposite sign of
a′(n) irrespective of the value of σ. Second, even for small a′(n), when
a′(n) > 0 and σ → ∞ the derivative is always positive. Therefore
when a′(n) is small and positive, there are two regions where ∂k/∂n is
positive: one with low values of σ and another with large values of σ.
According to the previous analysis, assuming that the return of the
innovation depends on n has an effect on the derivative of the prob-
ability of innovation with respect to n. In what follows we will show
that this assumption has no significant effect on the analysis of the
equilibrium as n→∞.
The equilibrium price solves:
h(p) (p− ε) 1
a n
+ σ
(
n− 1
n
) (
p− ε
p
)
− 1 = 0
When n→∞, the first term will go to zero because a∞ > 0. Therefore,
the equilibrium price is the same as before, p = σ
σ−1 ε, which is less
than the maximum possible revenue (a∞ v¯) only if σ > a∞v¯/(a∞v¯−ε).
When σ ≤ a∞v¯/(a∞v¯ − ε), on the other hand, there is no equilibrium
price such that the probability of innovation is positive.
The probability of innovation is 1− F (p/a∞). There are two possi-
ble cases. If a∞ < ∞ then the probability of innovation is less than
optimal, just as in the basic model. If a∞ =∞ then the probability of
innovation will go to 1 for σ > 1 and 0 for σ ≤ 1, which is the same as
assuming ε = 0 in the basic model.
5.2. On the distribution of values of the innovation. Another
assumption of the basic model is that there is asymmetric informa-
tion on the value of the innovation (read Gallini and Wright (1990)
and Bessen (2004) for good discussions of why this assumption makes
sense). However, we will show that the results do not depend on the
existence of asymmetric information. All that is needed for the results
is a downward sloping demand for innovations.
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An alternative interpretation could be that there is a continuum of
innovators with decreasing returns to their innovations. Suppose that
the innovators are indexed by the return to their innovations, which
ranges between v to v¯. Now, F (v) is the measure of innovations with a
return less or equal than v. Also, assume that the innovations do not
compete against each other in the final good market and that the input
sellers cannot price discriminate between the innovators. It is easy to
see that all the previous results translate directly into this setting. All
that changes is that now 1− F (c) is not the probability of innovation
but the measure of innovations performed.
A second alternative would be to assume that there is a continuum
of perfectly competitive innovators and that the inputs are not used in
research, but in the production of every unit of final good. This descrip-
tion is closer to Cournot’s (1838) theory of complementary monopoly.
The production function of output is y = (
∑n
i=1 n
ρ−1 xiρ)
1/ρ
and the
demand of the final good is y = 1 − F (py), where y and py are the
quantity and price of the final good. In this case, the input demands in
Proposition 1 still solve the CMP, but c becomes a marginal cost per
unit of final good. Competition leads price to marginal cost (py = c),
but c still remains above ε. 1−F (c) is now the equilibrium quantity of
final good, but all the previous results still hold. However, now there is
a welfare loss from the anti-competitive pricing in the inputs market,
which is approximately equal to (c− ε)(F (c)− F (ε))/2.
5.3. No price discrimination. We can also relax the assumption
that the innovator is a perfect price discriminator. Dropping this as-
sumption introduces a wedge between the social and private values of
the innovation. This means that the distribution of values of inno-
vation changes, and that now there is also an inefficiency in the final
good sector. Assume that the social value of the innovation is still
distributed according to F (v), with probability density function f(v).
However, the private value of the innovation is now vp, which is less
than the social value of the innovation. With a linear demand for the
final good, for example, the private return of the innovation would be
vp = v/2, which has a probability density function given by 2 f(2vp).
The qualitative results are the same as before. All that changes is that
now the probability of innovation decreases for each value of σ, and so
the values of σ∗, σˆ and σ¯ increase. Also, the optimal patent protection
is lower for each value of σ and n than in the case of perfect price
discrimination.
5.4. Uncertain return of the innovation. We have also assumed
that the innovator is the only one that knows the value of the innova-
tion. In this section we ask what happens if v is also unknown to the
innovator. Formally, we do this by changing the timing of the game:
(i) the input producers simultaneously set the price of their inputs, (ii)
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given prices, the innovator calculates the input mix that minimizes the
cost of innovation and then decides whether to innovate or not, and
(iii) Nature extracts a value v for the innovation from the distribution
F (v).
We begin by solving the second stage of the game. The innovator
decides what would be the optimal combination of inputs to perform
the innovation in case he decides to perform it. This leads to the
same cost of innovation and conditional demands as before. Then, the
innovator decides whether to perform the innovation or not, in order to
maximize expected profits E(v)− c. The innovation will be performed
if E(v) ≥ c and will not be performed otherwise. If E(v) < ε, then
the innovation will never be performed, so we assume that E(v) ≥ ε.
We also assume that the innovator will perform the innovation when
indifferent between performing it or not (E(v) = c).
The uncertainty has now passed from the input sellers to the input
producer. The problem of the input sellers is deterministic, they know
E(v) and they know that if the price is higher than E(v) the innovation
will not be performed. In this case, the inputs are always market
substitutes unless σ = 0. It is easy to show that the innovation will
always be performed, and that the elasticity of substitution only affects
the distribution of payoffs between the input sellers and the innovator.
Lemma 4 shows that input demands are discontinuous at a certain
price, and Proposition 11 proves that in the symmetric equilibrium
c ≤ E(v) so the innovation is always performed.
Lemma 4. Input demands are discontinuous at
pi =
(
nE(v)1−σ −
∑
j 6=i
pj
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
Proof. The demand for inputs is positive if the cost of innovation is not
larger than the expected value of the innovation, that is:
n−
1
1−σ
(
n∑
i=1
pi
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
≤ E(v)
Rearranging terms, we get the condition on the price of the input:
pi ≤
(
nE(v)1−σ −
∑
j 6=i
pj
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
If pi is larger than this value, then the innovation is not performed and
the demand for all inputs is zero.
The input sellers want to maximize profits xi (pi − ε). Proposition
11 states the solution of the game.
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Proposition 11. The equilibrium price when the return of the inno-
vation is uncertain for the innovator is:
p =
{ σ(n−1)
σ(n−1)−nε if σ >
n
n−1
E(v)
E(v)−ε
E(v) otherwise
Proof. After imposing symmetry, the derivative of xi (pi − ε) with re-
spect to pi becomes:
D(p) =
1
n
(
−σ(n− 1)
n
p− ε
p
+ 1
)
Lemma 4 implies than if the derivative with respect to price is posi-
tive at p = E(v), this is a symmetric equilibrium, as firms are making
positive profit, do not want to lower price (D ≥ 0), and would have a
zero profit if they would rise price. This happens when σ ≤ n
n−1
E(v)
E(v)−ε .
When σ > n
n−1
E(v)
E(v)−ε , on the other hand, the equilibrium price solves
the unrestricted first order condition D(p) = 0.
6. Conclusions.
Innovation in hi-tech industries is sequential (each innovation builds
on previous innovations) and complex. In this context patent protec-
tion affects the expected profits of the innovator in two ways: (i) by
increasing her expected revenues because of the monopoly power it
grants over the innovation; (ii) by increasing the cost of innovation,
since the innovator must pay each of the previous patented innovations
on which her new good is built.
In this paper we constructed a model of a complex and sequential in-
novation to analyze how the probability that an innovation is privately
profitable changes as technologies become more complex and the in-
puts used in research are patented. We found that the results depend
on the substitutability of the research inputs.
When the inputs are complements, the profitability of the innovation
is decreasing in the technological complexity. In the limit (when n →
∞), when the degree of substitutability is below a threshold level, which
is higher than 1, the innovation is never profitable. This paper therefore
gives a formal treatment of the tragedy of the anticommons.
On the other hand, when the inputs are substitutes, the profitability
of the innovation is increasing in technological complexity. Even in
this case, when n → ∞, the cost of gathering all the inputs for the
innovation is always too high from a social point of view and thus the
probability of innovation is suboptimal.
Since we used a very general model not relying on strong assump-
tions, our findings generalize the results of the literature on comple-
mentary monopoly, mainly concerned with perfect complementarity.
We also studied what happens when inputs are priced cooperatively,
either by a collective organization as a patent pool or by a single owner
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of all the inputs. We found that the cost of the innovation decreases
with respect to the non-cooperative pricing, when inputs are market
complements, while it increases when inputs are market substitutes.
This result is in line with the intuition of Shapiro (2001) and the model
of Lerner and Tirole (2004). In this sense the contribution of this
paper has been to use a more precise definition of complementarity
and substitutability. This has allowed us to study with greater detail
what is the intuition behind this result.
Finally we studied the welfare implications of the patent system. We
find that, when research inputs are complements, the optimal degree
of patent protection is decreasing in the complexity of the innovation.
This is the exact opposite of what we observe in the real world: the com-
plexity of technology is increasing but patents are becoming stronger
every day. Not only they have been recently extended to sectors previ-
ously lacking protection (sexually reproduced plants, software, business
methods, products and processes of biotechnology, including plants and
animals). Also patent length has been increasing over the years, and
an patent systems are being created in countries where they did not
previously exist. We think this is a contradiction worth to be studied
further.
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